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Philip L. Bryden

The Democratic Intellect:
The State In The Work Of
Madame Justice Wilson*

Introduction
It is a great honour to have been asked to provide an essay for this
volume of reflections on the contribution Madame Justice Bertha
Wilson has made to the development of law in Canada. To a certain
extent, this is a matter of pride in finding my own name associated
with that of the very learned and respected individuals who have set
out their thoughts in this collection of articles. In the main, however,
the honour comes from the opportunity to make a public statement of
my own respect and admiration for Madame Justice Wilson and the
significant role that she has played in our law and in our society.
Mine are the observations of someone who worked for Justice
Wilson as a law clerk for roughly eighteen months, from January 1983
until August 1984. They are also the observations of a legal academic
with an interest in constitutional and administrative law. They are,
without a doubt, coloured by my deep affection for Justice Wilson as
an individual. I do not know anyone who has served with Justice
Wilson as a law clerk who does not regard that experience as a great
privilege. In my own case, the opportunity to clerk for Justice Wilson
provided me with both a formative experience for my legal career and
a relationship that has enriched my life in areas that extend far beyond
the boundaries of the law. Notwithstanding these personal prejudices,
I have tried to bring to my comments a scholarly objectivity, and it is
my hope that any deficiency that you may detect on this score will be
compensated for by such insights as someone who has worked with a
judge on a personal and confidential basis may properly offer.
The organizers of this volume, and of the symposium at which the
papers in it were presented, asked the authors to structure our observations around the theme of "The Democratic Intellect", a term coined
by George Elder Davie to describe the distinctive features of Scottish
higher education in the nineteenth century,' and one that can be
employed to reflect the tensions between communitarian and liberal
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ideals that influence Canadian jurisprudence in the post-Charter era.
The theme strikes me as a useful one insofar as it encourages us to
recognize the inadequacy of efforts to encompass Justice Wilson's
legal work within traditional descriptive categories. To take only one
example, Justice Wilson can be described as a "liberal" judge in any of
a number of ways in which this term is employed - indeed, I shall be
using this description myself later in my paper- but I believe that an
attempt to focus exclusively on this facet of her judicial thinking is
likely to obscure as much of her contribution to law in Canada as it
reveals. The challenge of thinking about hers as a "democratic intellect" is that we are invited to explore facets of her judicial work that
might otherwise be neglected.
While acknowledging the usefulness of the democratic intellect as
a starting point for our consideration of Justice Wilson's judicial
work, I want to take some liberties with the theme in this article, at
least in so far as I do not propose to say anything about the extent to
which the values that underlie the democratic intellect of the Scottish
enlightenment can be used to explain why Justice Wilson viewed the
state as she did. 2 I say this because I feel much more confident in my
ability to comprehend the contribution Justice Wilson has made to our
understanding of the state in Canadian law than I am in my ability to
provide a philosophical or psychological explanation for it. With due
respect to those who may be able to give an account of Justice
Wilson's work in which the democratic intellect has explanatory
force, I would prefer to be more cautious in my use of the ideas that
this term conjures up. What I propose to do instead is begin with a
description of some of the salient characteristics that I believe Justice
Wilson exhibited as a judge, and then relate those characteristics to the
understanding of the state that I find emerges from her judicial writing. I believe these judicial characteristics are consistent with the
theme of Justice Wilson as a "democratic intellect", but I do not offer
this as an explanation of their presence in her work.
L Justice Wilson's Characteristicsas a Judge
The choice of Justice Wilson's judicial characteristics as an organizing tool for exploring her views of the state struck me initially as a
2. Justice Wilson's knowledge of, and interest in, the work of Scottish enlightenment writers is
evident from her lecture "The Scottish Enlightenment: The Third Shumiatcher Lecture in 'The
Law as Literature' (1987), 51 Sask. L. Rev. 251. I have not found it productive, however, to
attempt to pursue a possible relationship between this interest and Justice Wilson's judicial
thinking about the Canadian state.
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suitable one in a volume that was dedicated to the consideration of her
judicial work. Moreover, it seemed to me that those of us who have
worked for Justice Wilson might have insights as a result of this
experience that could usefully be shared with others. I was, however,
troubled by the possibility that this might detract from this essay's
focus on Justice Wilson's thinking about the state. Other organizational principles were certainly plausible candidates, but in the end I
decided that the peculiar status of the state in Canadian law reinforced
my idea that an exploration of Justice Wilson's judicial character was
a particularly appropriate vehicle for gaining an understanding of her
view of the state.
In its working paper on The Legal Status of the Federal Administration, the Law Reform Commission of Canada has pointed out that
Canadian law does not possess a modem and coherent description of
the state or of the status of governmental officials as they carry out
their duties.3 This is not simply a recognition that such accomodation
as we have made for the state in our law is shaped by our history and
by competing visions of what ought to be the relationships among the
various organs of government and between them and individuals and
social groups. It is an acknowledgement that, by and large, Canadians
have not tried to develop a comprehensive legal vision of the state for
purposes of institutional design and improvement. It is as if we were
building contractors who were constantly engaged in household renovations, and occasionally performed this work with some skill, but
who had made a choice (whether deliberate or unconscious) not to
avail ourselves of the services of an architect. 4
What this means for present purposes is that in deciding cases in
which the limits of state authority are challenged, judges have significant freedom to call upon a range of doctrines that enable them to
justify different decisions on the merits without impinging too obvi-

3. Law Reform Commission of Canada, The Legal Statusofthe FederalAdmninistration(Working
Paper 40), (Ottawa: LR.C.C., 1985) especially Chapter 1.
4. Suspicion of overarching solutions to the problematic legal status of the state tends to be a
characteristic shared by legal conservatives and progressive administrative law scholars. The
attitude of the latter is typified by the oft-quoted observation made by John Willis that "The
principle of uniqueness' is the principle for me". J.Willis, "The McRuer Report: Lawyers'
Values and Civil Servants' Values" (1968), 18 U.T.LJ. 351 at p. 359. One by-product of this
suspicion is that at the legislative level we have tended to prefer piecemeal changes to the legal
structure of government over comprehensive reforms, and that even changes that could have
significant structural implications (such as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) have
placed fundamental control over the pace of change in the hands of an institution -the judiciary
- that by its very nature is forced to react to problems on a ease by case basis. See P. Bryden,
"Canadian Administrative Law: Where We've Been" (1991), 16 Queen's LJ.7.
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ously on legal convention and the concept of adherence to precedent.
This is especially true in the kind of close cases that a final court of
appeal is called upon to decide. These are situations, in other words,
in which the judicial values or character of the judge occupy a place in
the decision-making process that is as prominent as her knowledge of
the law or her skill and ingenuity in crafting a persuasive rationale for
the chosen outcome. Accordingly, they are the types of cases in which
the judge's values are not only revealed, but in which the judge's way
of thinking about the responsibilities ofjudicial office may, in significant measure, shape her view of the law.
The first characteristic that I associate with Justice Wilson's career
as a judge is her commitment to a very traditional sense of professionalism. This may seem an odd choice, especially to those, possibly
influenced by the popular press, who may be inclined to see Justice
Wilson as a radical or a rebel on the bench I believe she was nothing
of the kind, and I think it is fair to say that she never saw or presented
herself as such. 6 Instead, I think she was a judge who saw traditional
legal skills and methods as pregnant with possibilities for fresh insights
into the human condition and for new and more productive ways of
regulating the relations that human beings have with each other and
the state. She took seriously the work of feminist scholars such as
Carol Gilligan, 7 but she was equally happy to draw inspiration from
eminent judges such as Lord MacMillan for her view that holders of
judicial office must make themselves aware of the social implications
of their decisions." Far from rejecting the lawyerly arts of textual and
case analysis, Justice Wilson delighted in them and believed that, used
with skill and imagination, they enhanced rather than hindered the
ability of a court to provide substantive justice to the litigants before it.
The second characteristic of Justice Wilson's judicial career that I
would highlight is her interest in the functioning of the courts, and on
a grander scale in the role of the courts within our system of government. Whether the issue was how to make the Supreme Court more
efficient so as to reduce to acceptable limits the delay between the
5. See P. Calamai, "Justice Bertha Wilson: odd judge out in Supreme Court", Ottawa Citizen,
November 30, 1985.
6. See Justice Wilson's letter to the editor in response to Mr. Calamai's article, in which she
states: "I am not a "reber' judge nor do I aspire to be one; that is not how legitimate dissent is
characterized on a collegial court where differing views are accepted with courtesy and respect."
7. B. Wilson, "Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?" (1990), 28 Osgoode Hall L.J.
507 at pp. 519-21.
8. B. Wilson, "Law in Society: The Principle of Sexual Equality" (1983), 13 Man. L. Rev. 221
at pp. 221,233; and see "Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?", supra note 7, at pp.
508-09,521.
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granting of leave to appeal and the rendering ofjudgment, 9 or how we
should rethink the role that intervenors ought to be allowed to play in
argument about the important issues that were brought before the
Court, 10 Justice Wilson gave the same care and attention to the implications of the way the Court functioned that she provided to the
preparation of her judgments themselves. Moreover, she did not
believe that the internal processes of the Court should be hidden
behind a veil of secrecy. Much as she disliked commentary that
focussed on personalities, commentary that in her view trivialized the
work of the judiciary," she welcomed and encouraged serious efforts
to understand the functioning of the courts and to suggest ways of
enhancing the confidence Canadians have in the quality of justice our
legal system provides.
Beyond this, Justice Wilson was sensitive, perhaps more so than
any of her colleagues on the Court, to the extent to which the Charter
threw into high relief the question of the appropriate role of the
judiciary within our system of government. In the summer before the
first Charter cases wound their way up to the Court, she spent a
significant amount of time reading, writing and thinking about this
issue in preparation for a speech to the Australian Legal Convention, 12
and I believe that this reflection helped to prepare her for some of the
difficult conceptual questions that were to face her and her colleagues
in the years to come. Indeed, it is a hallmark of her career as a speaker
about legal issues outside the judicial forum that she did not see these
as occasions for the mouthing of platitudes or after dinner humour, but
as opportunities to address, within the constraints of her judicial
office, serious issues that our legal system was being forced to confront.13
The third feature of Justice Wilson's approach to judicial decisionmaking to which I would draw attention is the intensity of her desire to
reconcile a commitment to legal ideas and principles with the need to
provide sound and practical resolutions to the problems of the litigants
who appeared before the Court. She is a person who reads widely, and

9. See B. Wilson, "Decision-Making in ihe SupremeCOufl.' (1986), 36 UI.T.LI. 227 at pp. 233-

35.
10. Ibid. at pp. 241-44.
11. Supra note 6.
12. B. Wilson, "Guaranteed Freedoms in a Free Society - A New Role for the Courts?",
Address to the 22nd Australian Legal Convention, Brisbane, Australia, 1983.
13. See, eg., "The Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1985), 50 Sask. LR. 169; "DecisionMaking in the Supreme Court", supra note 9; "Will Women Judges Really Make a Difference?",
supra note 7.
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the breadth of her knowledge and the depth of her interest in ideas is
apparent to even a casual reader of her judgments and her published
speeches. Nevertheless, she was very reluctant as a judge to let her
interest in ideas and the development of the law distract her from her
responsibilities to the litigants.
I am sure that she will forgive me if I recount one anecdote from
my time as her law clerk that I think illustrates the matter nicely. I was
seeing her in her office after lunch one day and she recounted to me a
conversation she had with one of her colleagues in the judge's dining
room. The colleague had commented on her view on some issue or
other with the observation that it was obvious that she was simply a
result oriented judge. Her response was that she took that as a
compliment, knowing full well, of course, that her colleague's remark
had not been offered as one. My point here is that she believed that the
law had to be of service to human beings, and the law's failure to
produce appropriate results in individual instances had implications
for the legal ideas that produced these results. She was not a judge
who was prepared to content herself with the observation that hard
cases make bad law; she took the view that hard cases meant that
judges had to work just that much harder.
I have created this portrait of Justice Wilson's approach to the art
of being a judge because I think it helps to explain the way that she
viewed the state. In particular, I believe that her commitment to
traditional legal methodology and the production of socially acceptable results had a softening effect on what I would regard as the
dominant view of the state that appears in her judicial work, which is
that the state represents a potential threat to individual autonomy that
needs to be checked by a mechanism of accountability through law.
I should note as well that I rely very heavily in the observations
that follow on judgments in which Justice Wilson did not have the
support of the majority of her colleagues on the Supreme Court of
Canada. I do this because I want to highlight her distinctive vision of
the state, not because I think that her participation in the Court's
collective understanding of the place of the state in Canadian society
was insignificant. Justice Wilson believed that respectful differences
of opinion were natural features of a collegial court that must, as our
Supreme Court does, grapple with extraordinarily difficult legal and
social issues. 14 I think that she was disappointed at the inability of the
14. See "The Charter of Rights and Freedoms", supra note 13; "Decision-Making in the
Supreme Court", supra note 9. One sign of Justice Wilson's respect for the views of her
colleagues is that she did not follow the practice commonly employed by United States Supreme
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Supreme Court to function more effectively as a collegial body that
might be able to offer Canadians a collective wisdom that was greater
than the sum of the insights of its individual members. I do not,
however, believe that she thought that dissent was inconsistent with a
spirit of collegiality, or that its suppression would enhance the collegial functioning of the Court, though I am not sure that all of her
colleagues shared that view.
11. Justice Wilson and the Accountable State -A Modern Liberal
Conception
At the base of Justice Wilson's understanding of the state was the
liberal conception of government standing in contrast to the individual
and representing at least a potential threat to the autonomy of the
individual. Her intellectual roots are in the liberal tradition and it was
not by accident that she found herself relying, in her discussion of
liberty in the Jones's and Morgentalert6 cases, on the work of John
Stuart Mill. Thus, we find her writing in Jones:
I believe that the framers of the Constitution in guaranteeing "liberty"
as a fundamental value in a free and democratic society had in mind the
freedom of the individual to develop and realize his potential to the full,
to plan his own life to suit his own character, to make his own choices
for good or ill, to be non-conformist, idiosyncratic and even eccentric
to be, in today's parlance, "his own person" and accountable as
such. John Stuart Mill described it as "pursuing our own good in our
own way". This, he believed, we should be free to do "so long as we do
not7attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain
it.

Court judges in constitutional cases of building up a shadow jurisprudence relying on their own
dissenting opinions. This, I believe, was a conscious decision on herpart. For example, in Jones
v. The Queen, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284 at p. 322, she showed signs of a desire to cling to the position
she had taken in her concurring judgment in Reference Re British Columbia Motor Vehicle Act,
[1985] 2 S.C.Rt 486, that once a court had found that the government had deprived a person of
life, liberty or security of the person in a way that was not in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice, such a violation of s. 7 of the Charter could never, as a matter of law, be
justified by the government under s. 1.Even in the Jones case itself she was willing to accept the
possibility that she, rather than the majority, had been wrong on this point, and in later cases she
showed that she was prepared to accept and rely upon majority decisions with which she had not
agreed. For an example of this, see her references in American Farm Bureau Federation v.
CanadianImport Tribunal, [19901 2 S.C.R. 1324, to the majority judgment in PaccarofCanada
Ltd. v. CAIMAW, Local 14, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 983, from which she had dissented.
15. Jones,supra note 14, at pp. 318-19.
16. R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30 at pp. 166-67.
17. Jones, supra note 14, at p. 318.
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I do not mean to suggest by this that Justice Wilson rigorously
applied the philosophical insights of Mill (or Dworkin, or Rawls or
any other modem liberal philosopher) in her judicial writing. As Marc
Gold has pointed out, 8 judicial decision-making is an exercise in
persuasion as well as a statement of the reasoning that leads to a
particular conclusion. Specific references to Mill's work are less
likely to demonstrate a commitment to the proposition that details of
his philosophy accurately define the constitutional rights of Canadians
than they are to reflect a sense of the power that appeals to liberal
individualism in almost any of its guises have in modem Canadian
society.
Even if Justice Wilson's judicial work resists labelling as the
product of any particular "school" of liberal philosophy, it is equally
evident that hers were moderate liberal views rather than libertarian
ones. She did not conceive of individuals as isolated or abstracted
from their social context. Thus she was not prepared in Jones to
define the appellant's constitutionally protected interest in liberty as
one that rested solely on his freedom to do as he pleased, rather than
on the significance of those choices and the rationales for them within
a framework of social relationships. She wrote:
The relations of affection between an individual and his family and his
assumption of duties and responsibilities towards them are central to
the individual's sense of self and of his place in the world. The right to
educate his children is one facet of this larger concept.... However,
the appellant's proposition that he has a right to educate his children
"as he sees fit" goes too far. Having regard to the structure of the
constitution and the values it explicitly identifies as worthy of protection, I believe that the liberty interest protected is the parent's right to
educate his children in accordance with his conscientious beliefs and I
think this is in fact the right the appellant is asserting in this case."
Indeed, this sense of the social context in which rights are asserted
permeated her thinking about the Charter, as one might expect of a
judge who cared intensely about the consequences of her decisions.
Most notably, she espoused a view of equality rights in the Andrews2"
and Turpin2' cases that was oriented toward the protection of those
18. M. Gold, "The Mask of Objectivity: Politics and Rhetoric in the Supreme Court of Canada"
(1985), 7 Supreme Court L Rev. 455.
19. [1986] 2 S.C.R. at pp. 319-20. The same point can be made about the constraints on a
woman's freedom to terminate her pregnancy that she accepted as legitimate in Morgentaler,
supra note 16, at [1988] 1 S.C.R. pp. 181-83.
20. Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143.
21. R. v. Turpin, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1296.
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who, for historical reasons, had suffered from discrimination, rather
than toward the more abstract liberal notion of formal equality. Likewise, she was prepared to join her colleagues in retreating from the
tendency, so evident in American constitutional thought, to attibute to
artificial persons the characteristics of individuals32 In the end, however, the individual remained of central importance to her, and I think
her dissenting judgment in the Thompson Newspapers case 3 is a good
illustration of her sense that state power against the individual must be
constrained even if this had the incidental effect of undermining state
regulatory authority over powerful economic interests.
There is nothing terribly remarkable about the observation that
liberal individualism should form the backdrop against which Justice
Wilson's image of the state was constructed. As Rod Macdonald has
argued, liberalism is the dominant (if not the only) political conception that informs Canadian legal thought,24 and as I have suggested,
Justice Wilson's character as a legal professional was not one that
would have led her to reject a philosophical construct that underlies
much of the conventional lawyer's understanding of the world. What
the pragmatic side of her judicial character encouraged her to recognize, however, was that in the modem regulatory welfare state, merely
protecting the individual from the coercive power of the state was not
a guarantee of individual autonomy. If the individual was to be free to
realize his or her goals and ambitions, the positive power of the state
would have to be harnessed as well.
Justice Wilson responded to the challenge of recognizing a positive role for the state in the promotion of individual liberty and
personal security by adopting a view of the state that legitimated state
action through the mechanism of legal accountability. In this conception the state was subtly transformed from a body that threatened the
individual by its mere existence (a necessary evil, perhaps, but an evil
nonetheless) into a body that contributed both to individual and collective welfare but that became threatening when it sought to exceed
its legal bounds, whether those bounds were defined by the constitu-

22- Compare Irwin Toy Ltd. v. A.G. Quebec, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 with American Supreme Court
decisions such as the Sinking Fund cases (1879), 99 U.S. 700; Santa Clara County v. Southern
PacificRailroadCo. (1886), 118 U.S. 394; and Wheeling Steel Corp.v. Gander(1949), 337 U.S.
562.
23. ThompsonNewspapersv. DirectorofInvestigationandResearch,RestrictiveTradePractices
Commission, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425.
24. R. Macdonald, "Understanding Regulation by Regulations" in I. Bernier and A. Lajoie
(eds.), Regulations, Crown Corporationsand Administrative Tribunals(Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1985) at 81.
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tion or by traditional principles of administrative law. Justice Wilson's
decisions manifest what I will describe as a modem liberal conception
of the accountable state in three ways. First of all, Justice Wilson
defined the state itself in a way that promoted the broadest scope for
state legal accountability that was consistent with the maintenance of
a distinction between the realms of state and private action. This was
true even in her pre-Charter decisions. Thus she took a narrow view
of Crown immunity from the application of statute in her partially
dissenting judgment in R. v. Eldorado Nuclear Ltd. I When we
consider her decisions applying the Charter, they are notable for her
willingness to subject to judicial scrutiny a very broad range both of
governmental activities and public bodies. For example, in the Operation Dismantle case she decided that the exercise of the royal
prerogative was subject to review under the Charter, and in the mandatory retirement casesP she was prepared to treat universities and
hospitals as governmental entities for purposes of Charter applicability. She did not see this expansive vision of the state as one that broke
down the distinction between public and private bodies (as is reflected
by her concurrence with the majority decision in the DolphinDelivery
case2s ) but she did take a broader view of what fell within the public
realm than most of her colleagues.
Secondly, Justice Wilson was very active in expanding the mechanisms for governmental accountability through law. Sometimes this
tendency manifested itself in her application of fairly conventional
administrative law concepts, such her use of the relevant considerations doctrine in Oakwood Development Ltd. v. Rural Municipality of
St. FrancoisXavier,29 or her application of the "patently unreasonable
interpretation" test in her dissenting judgment in the Paccarcase. °

25. [1983] 2 S.C.R. 551.
26. OperationDismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441.
27. University of British Columbia v. Connell, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 451; McKinney v. Guelph
University, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 457; Vancouver GeneralHospitalv. Stoffnan, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483;
In re Douglas College, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 570.
28. RWSDU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.
29. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 164.
30. Paccarof Canada Ltd. v. CAIMAW, Local 14, supra note 14. Her dissent in this case is
notable for placing an obligation on an administrative agency to interpret its governing statute in
a way that is consonant with the principles underlying the legislation, even if this interpretation
does some violence to the plain meaning of the words of the enactment. This view of the role of
the courts in jurisdictional review cases stands in sharp contrast to the more traditional sense that
the courts are obliged to constrain administrative agency attempts at creative problem-solving
where such efforts would take the agency beyond the limits of its legislative mandate. See Re
Syndicat des Employis de Productiondu Quebec et de 'Acadie and C.L.R.B., [1984] 2 S.C.R.
412.
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On other occasions she extended private law concepts (such as the
breach of fiduciary duty in Guerin v. The Queen31 and the tort of
negligence in Nielsen v. Kamloops') in ways that enhanced the accountability of public bodies to those affected by their decisions. Of
greatest significance, however, was her willingness in Singh v. Ministerof Employment andImmigration33 to extend the procedural protection of s. 7 of the Charter to individuals laying claim to benefits
provided by statute where governmental failure to confer those benefits impinged on the personal security of those individuals. Indeed,
Singh was a paradigm case in which the efforts of the positive state
were required to enhance individual autonomy, yet in which it was
equally important that these efforts were subjected to a regime of legal
accountability.
The third manifestation of Justice Wilson's commitment to an
accountable state was her continued willingness to stringently apply
the Oakes test for government justification under s. 1 of the Charter
of the infringement of rights guaranteed by the Charter. In many ways
the Edwards Books case , decided late in 1986, represented a watershed decision for the Court on the application of the Oakes test outside
of the criminal law context, and from that point onward Justice Wilson
found herself increasingly isolated in her attempts to confine justifiable infringements of rights and freedoms to those that represented a
minimal impairment of the interests protected by the Charter.3 Indeed, as I shall suggest shortly, Justice Wilson was not entirely consistent herself on this score. As a general rule, however, she was more
willing than any of her colleagues on the Court to impose on the state
an obligation to respond more creatively to the need to protect the
rights and freedoms enshrined in the Charter as it pursued other
socially desirable goals.
Justice Wilson did not envisage the modem regulatory welfare
state as the home of what Lord Hewart described as "the new despotism".3? The image of the Canadian state that appears most frequently
in her judicial work is that of an entity that not only strives to serve the

31. [19841 2 S.C.R. 335.
32. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2. See also Tock v. St. John's MetropolitanArea Board, [1989] 2 S.C.R.
1181 and Vernon v. Manolakos, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1529.
33. [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.
34. R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
35. R. v. Edwards Books, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.
36. See R. Elliot, "The Supreme Court of Canada and Section 1: The Erosion of the Common
Front" (1987), 12 Queens LJ.277.
37. Lord Hewart, The New Despotism (London: E. Benn, 1929).
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needs and aspirations of individuals, but to a certain extent succeeds in
doing so. Justice Wilson saw, however, that in the course of this
service the state has a tendency to constrain individual freedom without sufficient justification. The main critique that emerges from such
a vision is that the state is clumsy rather than that it is malevolent The
role of the law in this state is to ensure that such justifications as might
exist for the state's constraint on the individual's freedom are put
forward in court, scrutinized with care and rejected when the state's
legitimate goals can be achieved with less intrusion on individual
liberty.
III. Justice Wilson and the OrganicState - Respectfor Tradition
I wrote earlier that I believed that the dominant view of the state that is
found in Justice Wilson's judicial work is the picture of the accountable state that I have just described. There is, however, another side to
the state that is represented in her decisions and I believe it is one that
should not be ignored. That is a view of the state as an organic entity
that cannot be separated from its history and traditions. I am reluctant
to describe this as a communitarian view because I suspect that in
Justice Wilson's case it had more to do with the triumph of experience
over logic than it did with the legal recognition of the rights claims of
groups as opposed to individuals. My point here is that Justice
Wilson's idealized view of an accountable state in Canadian law is
one that is bounded by the messy reality of the Canadian state as it
emerged in history, and Justice Wilson's professional respect for
tradition and her store of practical wisdom was sufficiently great that
she was frequently reluctant to press the claims of the state as she
might want it to be on the state as it actually existed.
The first example I will give of this respect for tradition is Justice
Wilson's acceptance of the conventions of legal discourse themselves.
This is nicely illustrated by her partial dissent in the EldoradoNuclear
casey that I mentioned earlier. The logic of the accountable state is
one that at least presumptively renders the concept of Crown immunity from statute obsolete. On this view of what was required to do
justice in the case, there would be no reason to draw a distinction
between the two defendant Crown corporations, yet Justice Wilson
did accept such a distinction and would have accorded Crown immu38. "Thelifeofthelawhas no been logic: it has been experience." Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.,
The Common Law (Boston: Little, 1881) atp. 1.
39. Supra note 25.
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nity from the application of the competition laws to Uranium Canada
but not to Eldorado Nuclear. The reason she did this was that her
review of the relevant legal authorities supported such a distinction
and she was not prepared to ignore the constraints that those authorities placed upon her. My point here is that Justice Wilson may have
been a result oriented judge, but she was above all else a professional
who respected the constraints that professionalism imposes on the
holders of judicial office.
The second type of example of Justice Wilson's sensitivity to
historical context is her willingness in at least some situations to limit
the obligation of the state to be creative in its avoidance of excessive
impingement on constitutionally protected rights and freedoms. For
instance, if one looks only at the legal principles at stake, I find it
difficult to reconcile Justice Wilson's dissent in EdwardsBooks 4 with
the judgment she wrote for the Court in the Ontario Education Act
Reference.41 In both situations there were means by which the government of Ontario could have achieved its objectives while showing
greater respect for the religious freedom of those who would be
affected by its plans, yet Justice Wilson would have required the
government to adopt these measures in one case but not the other. As
a technical matter, Justice Wilson avoided the issue of minimal impairment of religious freedom in the OntarioEducationAct Reference
by deciding that the Charter did not apply to religious minority education obligations undertaken pursuant to s. 93 of the Constitution Act
1867. It seems to me, however, that this does not completely answer
the argument that, once the Charter came into effect, the province had
an obligation to develop a mechanism for the financing of all forms of
religious education that was comparable to the plan used to fund
Roman Catholic schools. Rather than being a function of the inexorable logic of the interaction between Canada's 1867 and 1982 constitutional documents, therefore, I believe this decision has to be understood as the product of a practical judgment that the preservation of
certain historical relationships was more important than adherence to
the principle that an accountable state should structure its affairs in a
way that does not favour one religion over another.
The similar point can be made by comparing Justice Wilson's
willingness to concur with the majority judgment in R. v. Keegstra'2
with her defence of freedom of expression in her dissenting judgment

40. Supra note 35..
41. [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148.

42. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
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in the street prostitution cases.43 The cornerstone of Justice Wilson's
argument in the latter cases is her conclusion that the Criminal Code's
restriction of the freedom of prostitutes and their customers to communicate in public for purposes of the sale of sex was not proportionate to the objectives sought to be achieved. In other words, the
legislation was not sufficiently tailored to meet the government's
legitimate objectives while offering minimal impairment of the individual interests protected by the Charter. This is the same line of
argument that was advanced by the dissenting judges in Keegstra, and
it is not obvious to me that Canada's hate propoganda laws are
significantly more successful at striking the right balance between
important state policy and the minimal impairment of freedom of
speech than is the criminal regime we have chosen to use in regulating
street prostitution. In my view, Justice Wilson's support of the majority in Keegstra is a reflection of her sense that the history of the
persecution of racial and religious minorities in our own and other
countries was of such overwhelming significance that the courts should
not weigh with too fine a hand the balance between the government's
effort to protect the freedom and security of those individuals and the
expression lights of those who might seek to vilify them.
The third example I would offer of Justice Wilson's sensitivity to
the organic nature of the state is her willingness, exhibited only late in
her judicial career," to envisage legal accountability as something that
was available through agencies other than the courts. To an administrative lawyer, her concurring opinion in American Farm I and her
dissenting judgment in the Lester case" are remarkable for two reasons. The first is Justice Wilson's express rejection of the tendency of
our courts to apply Dicey's nineteenth century liberal view of the
administrative state in twentieth century Canadian society.47 The
second, and really more interesting point, is her recognition that by
enhancing the accountability of administrative tribunals to the courts
through an expansive conception of the grounds for jurisdictional

43. Reference re Sections 193 and195.1(1)(c) of the CriminalCode, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123; R. v.
Stagnitta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1226; R. v. Skinner, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1235.
44. In the earlier part of herjudicial career, Justice Wilson was inclined to elevate the role of the
courts as vehicles for vindicating the rights of individuals, even if alternative arrangements for
such vindication existed through administrative agencies. See, eg., Bhadauria v. Board of
Governors of Seneca College (1979), 27 O.R. (2d) 142 (C.A.), rev'd [1981] 2 S.C.R. 181.
45. American FarmBureau Federationv. CanadianImport Tribunal,supranote 14.
46. UnitedAssociationofJourneymenandApprenticesofthePlumbingandPipefittingIndustry,
Local 740 v. W.W. Lester Ltd., [1990 3 S.C.R. 644.
47. See American Farm,supra note 14, at pp. 1332-46; Lester, supranote 46, at pp. 650-51.
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review, we run the risk of diminishing the state's ability to serve the
needs of individuals for the prompt and conclusive resolution of
disputes in a forum other than the courts.4 Here the pragmatic
recognition of what makes for legal accountability in the regulatory
state as it has emerged triumphs over the principled account of administrative agency accountability in law through the courts.
My point in raising these examples is neither to criticize Justice
Wilson for inconsistency in her decisions nor to comment upon the
development of her judicial thinking over time. Indeed, in a judicial
career that spanned fifteen years and in which Justice Wilson participated in significant changes to the very structure of Canadian public
law, it would be remarkable if inconsistency and the development of
new ideas were not present in her judgments. Rather, I raise them
because I believe they illustrate the complexity of Justice Wilson's
view of the modem state, and her willingness to be moved by the
claims of tradition and of pragmatism, as well as by the claims of
principle, in her understanding of the relationships among the individual, the courts and the other arms of government.
In his book The Needs of Strangers,Michael Ignatieff describes
the conflict between the freedom of individuals in a society to choose
what will be recognized as needs that must be satisfied and the type of
freedom that can only exist in a social setting that defines for us when
these choices have been made correctly. Near the end of the book, he
makes the following observation:
It is a recurring temptation in political argument to suppose that these
conflicts can be resolved in principle, to believe that we can rank
human needs in an order of priority which will avoid dispute. Yet who
really knows whether we need freedom more than we need solidarity,
or fraternity more than equality? Modem secular humanism is empty if
it supposes that the human good is without internal contradiction.49
These contradictions cannot be resolved in principle, only in practice.
Our understanding of Justice Wilson's view of the state cannot be
complete unless we grasp the truth of this observation. In the previous
part of this paper, I described the dominant conception of the state in
Justice Wilson's judicial work as the modem liberal one of a state that
must be made accountable through law for its impact on the freedom
of individuals. I do not think I detract from the essential truth of that
observation by suggesting that throughout her judicial career, Justice

48. See American Farm, supranote 14, at pp. 1334-35; Lester, supra note 46, at p. 650.
49. M. Ignatieff, The Needs of Strangers(London: Chatto & Windus, 1984) at 137.
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Wilson did not operate on the assumption that the values implicit in
liberal individualism were the only ones worth pursuing or the only
ones that received legal sanction within our system of government.
Her way of resolving in practice the inevitable contradictions that
arose was to ground herself in the best traditions of the legal profession and the form of discourse on questions of great importance that
arises within those traditions. In this, as in so much else, we would do
well to emulate her.
Conclusion
I would like to conclude by returning to Justice Wilson's characteristics as a judge in order to make a final observation about their implications for the Canadian state as we know it. In my view, Justice Wilson
was a remarkable judge because of the way in which she sought to
fuse traditional legal approaches with fresh insights into our social and
political relationships with each other. In so doing, she risked (and
often experienced) isolation both from those who were unwilling to
move beyond a very conventional view of the demands of tradition
and from those who wished to be freed completely from the shackles
that such traditions represent. As the Canadian state lurches toward
either the rediscovery of itself or its disintegration in the months
ahead, we will have to learn whether we can find in ourselves even a
pale reflection of the qualities that Justice Wilson brought to the
understanding of Canada as a nation. Only time will tell whether we
will succeed in this endeavour, but if we do I believe that future
generations will look back on Justice Wilson's contribution to Canadian law and Canadian life as a source of inspiration.

